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Naming the Plague in Homer, Sophocles and Thucydides 
 
Abstract: This article focuses on the language used to describe the plague, and more 
specifically on the oscillation of its vocabulary between literal and figurative meaning, 
in Homer’s Iliad (1.1-487), Sophocles’ Oedipus the King (1-215), and Thucydides’ 
History of the Peloponnesian War (esp. 2.47.3-2.54). It is argued that the plague spreads 
in the language of the three narratives by association or contiguity, exploiting existing 
links with related words, most notably the broader vocabulary of disease and calamity, 
but it also spreads by analogy, comparison, or similarity, establishing links with other 
domains such as famine, blight, war and destruction.  
 
The Greek word for the plague, λοιμός, is relatively absent from the surviving texts of 
the archaic and classical periods. It is used once in Homer, once in Hesiod, three times 
in tragedy and in Herodotus, four times in Thucydides and Plato, and once in 
Demosthenes and Aeschines.1 Robin Mitchell-Boyask may well be right that 
superstition plays a role in this, especially for the period following the great plague of 
Athens of the early 420s.2 In the context of this article, however, I am more interested 
in the broader consequences of the phenomenon and in the possibilities it opens up for 
how the plague can be transmitted in poetic and historical narrative. If the plague is 
identified through other words and phrases that shift within and across a wide range of 
registers and blur the distinction between the literal and the figurative, such associations 
exemplify something fundamental about how pestilence spreads linguistically: it 
spreads not by maintaining an essence and an identity (be it biological, metaphysical, 
cognitive, or semantic) but through a dynamic process based on the exploitation of its 
linguistic hosts and on its own ability to adapt. It spreads by association or contiguity, 
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exploiting existing links with related words (most notably the broader vocabulary for 
disease and calamity), but it also spreads by analogy, comparison or similarity, 
establishing links between different and distinct domains (from famine to blight, war, 
and destruction). In what follows I show how the three earliest, and arguably most 
influential, representations of the plague in Western narrative, Homer’s Iliad 1, the 
opening scenes of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, and the digression on the Athenian 
plague in Thucydides’ book 2, revisit and reorganize a complex set of semantic, 
syntactical, and grammatical interconnections around the phenomenon of the plague, 
conceptualizing its power not only to disrupt order but also to exploit the reader’s desire 
for synthesis and meaning.3  
Loimos is a phenomenon which attacks indiscriminately, both within human 
communities and across different forms of animal and plant life around human 
communities. The Greeks found it at once very powerful in its devastating effects but 
also hard to understand because it cannot be directly observed. While the broader 
question of the place of the plague in Greek imagination requires a more detailed 
analysis than the one that can be undertaken in the context of this (or any) article,4 the 
discussion that follows makes a case for the significance of exploring the plague as a 
literary phenomenon. The article focuses on how the plague is communicated through 
language, how it relies on the association of different ideas and words, how it acquires 
meaning through contact with other domains and linguistic word-play, and how it 
reflects the ability of the plague itself to overwhelm and at the same time to lie outside 
of human intelligibility. The discussion moves away from the policing of the 
boundaries between the literal and the figurative in discourses associated with the 
history of medicine.5 It also moves away from the more prescriptive (and often 
inconsistent) distinctions between normal and deviant usage of words in ancient 
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rhetorical theories of tropes.6 Drawing on cognitive linguistics and continental critical 
thought,7 as well as on the rise of language as contagion in modern popular thought and 
critical discourse,8 the article is less interested in categorical and hierarchical 
distinctions between different types of figurative language (and their changing fortunes 
from ancient rhetoric to structural semiotics9) and more in the basic mechanisms 
through which such types of language become central to how the plague spreads in 
narrative. The plague creates narratives where crisis and disorder manifest themselves 
through reversals at the level of grammatical, syntactical, and semantic operations. 
Human beings, normally agents of action and grammatical subjects in control of verbal 
activity, become objects pulled into spheres of action outside their control. The plague 
claims the grammatical subject position and asserts its power through verbs that allow 
it to attach itself to other domains. What is more, both the subject positions and the 
verbal actions associated with the plague rely on borrowed vocabulary: they are based 
on analogy and displacement.  
 
Personification  
As early as the first Against Aristogeiton speech attributed to Demosthenes (and 
probably dated around 335-325BCE), loimos is used as a “metaphor” to speak of a 
pernicious person,10 with the speaker asking the jury to convict “the scapegoat, the 
plague” (ὁ φαρμακός, ὁ λοιμός, 25.80). The argument that a man’s unjust actions offend 
the gods and do his community harm that can manifest itself as the outbreak of a plague 
can be traced all the way back to Hesiod’s Works and Days, 240-245. This Hesiodic 
passage is quoted by another fourth-century orator, Aeschines, in Against Ctesiphon 
(3.135) to depict Demosthenes himself and his politics “as destructive to the political 
health of Athens,”11 in response to a claim by Demosthenes in On the False Embassy 
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(19.259), that a “terrible epidemic has fallen over Greece” (νόσημα … δεινὸν 
ἐμπέπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα). When the speaker of Against Aristogeiton accuses his 
opponent as “the plague,” then, this has all the seriousness of an accusation of pollution, 
but it also shows the ease with which religious language is activated in fourth-century 
speeches in public trials.12 To assess how bold is such a metaphor (and its combination 
with scapegoating), we need to consider not only “the tendency … in fifth-century 
writers to avoid the word loimos,”13 but also the complexities around the personification 
of the plague in earlier literature. What does the plague look like before the (real or 
imagined) law courts of the fourth century?  
For the purposes of this discussion, personification is a subcategory of 
metaphor, rather than a master trope of poetic discourse with primacy over metaphor 
and irony.14 To avoid the “conceptual confusion about [the] status and value” of 
personification, with its associations with the concepts of person and personality, we 
might revert to the term prosopopeia, the making of a face or mask, rather than of a 
person.15 The plague does not have a face (instead of a mask, or behind the mask), but 
the sense of artistic craftsmanship that the word prosopopeia entails is certainly 
relevant. As Jane Hedley argues, “prosopopeia is the trope of energeia.”16 It animates, 
setting in motion different actions and characteristics. In the case of the plague, the 
actions and characteristics of prosopopeia have to do with hostile, non-human agency. 
As it is argued below, they must be seen as a process of deification (agency of a hostile 
god or daemon), animification (agency of a predatory animal), and reification (agency 
of inanimate forces such as natural elements or weapons). They can even, perhaps, be 
linked to a process of anthropomorphism (if to be defeated by the plague comes with 
associations of a duel or an athletic competition, as we will also see below). 
Personification helps map the plague onto the distinct ontological categories of the 
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divine, animal, and inanimate in their opposition to the human. It also shows how such 
domains can blur into one another and overlap. In what follows, the plague is explored 
through the proliferation of what the medieval scholar Jim Paxson calls 
“micronarratives” of personification.17 The cumulative effect of those micronarratives 
is not the disruption of the overall narrative by seductive ornamentation and cosmetic 
concealment.18 Rather, it is the very constitution of narrative as the interweaving of 
different acts of destruction. To think of the personification of the plague is to bridge 
the “localized animate metaphors and the cognitive generalization that all linguistic 
activity involves.”19  
Adam Parry notes in connection to Thucydides’ vocabulary that “[t]he verb 
struck is ἐγκατασκῆψαι [2.47.3], the first appearance of it in a prose writer, and it is not 
in the medical corpus. Sophocles uses it, and before him, Aeschylus […]. Thucydides 
frequently puts his metaphors into verbs, and the suppressed image here, of a 
thunderbolt, is the same as what appears in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus.”20 This is by 
no means the only metaphor in Thucydides’ description of the plague. If we follow 
Parry’s suggestion to look for Thucydides’ predicative metaphors, we will find 
numerous other examples across his narrative of the plague. The plague descends on 
lower lands and on lower regions of the human body (κατέβη, 2.48.1; ἐπικατιόντος, 
2.49.6), but it also ascends (ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν ἀφίκετο, 2.48.2). It violently falls into 
cities and upon people (ἐνέπεσε, 2.48.2; ἐπιπέσοι, 2.48.3; προσέπιπτεν, 2.50.1, ἐπέπεσε, 
3.87.1), it fastens itself to its victims (ἥψατο, 2.48.2), it “is settled” (ἱδρυθὲν, 2.49.7), it 
“strikes” or “falls upon” places like lightning (ἐγκατασκῆψαι, repeated twice in 2.47.3) 
and on limbs “like a divine visitation” (κατέσκηπτε, 2.49.8), it takes limbs away 
(στερισκόμενοι τούτων διέφευγον, 2.49.8)21 leaving its violent marks on the body of the 
victim (τῶν ἀκρωτηρίων ἀντίληψις αὐτοῦ ἐπεσήμαινεν, 2.49.7), it “spreads/sweeps” in 
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the way fire does (ἐπενείματο, 2.54.5), it “seizes all alike” (πάντα ξυνῄρει, 2.51.3), it 
“destroys” (φθείρασα, 1.23..3; φθορὰ, 2.47.3; φθόρον, 2.51.4; διαφθαρῆναι, 2.51.6; 
φθόρος, 2.52.2; ἔφθειρε, 2.57.1; φθείρουσα, 2.58.2; τῇ νόσῳ ἀπολέσας, 2.58.3; νόσῳ τε 
γὰρ ἐφθάραται, 3.13.3; ἐκάκωσε 3.87.2),22 it “presses upon” in the way the war does (ἡ 
νόσος ἐπέκειτο ἅμα καὶ ὁ πόλεμος, 2.59.1), it “presses exceedingly heavily” 
(ὑπερβιαζομένου, 2.52.3; cf. ἐπίεσε, 3.87.2), it is a death sentence pronounced against 
the Athenians (κατεψηφισμένην, 2.53.4) hanging over their heads like a rock 
(ἐπικρεμασθῆναι, 2.53.4), a substance with which its victims are filled full (ἕτερος ἀφ᾿ 
ἑτέρου … ἀναπιμπλάμενοι, 2.51.4), a victorious warrior or athlete (ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ 
κακοῦ νικώμενοι, 2.51.5) whose victims die like the sheep (ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα 
ἔθνῃσκον, 2.51.4). In Thucydides, then, the plague has associations with the demonic 
(divine visitation), with birds of prey (falling upon, fastening itself to victims), with 
elemental forces (lightning, fire, rock), and with inanimate/material objects (applying 
pressure and causing marks on bodies; traveling through the routes of flux and settling 
in ways that cause blockage23). When Thucydides’ Pericles associates the plague with 
“what comes from the gods” (τά … δαιμόνια, 2.64.2), this does not have to be seen as 
metaphorical. If the violence of demons can be presented as a commonplace idea in 
Hippocratic writings (even if not convincing to rationalist healers),24 then there is no 
reason why such references, suggested by some of the vocabulary mentioned above, 
cannot also come across as persuasive in the rhetorical context of Pericles’ speech.25 
But, as the many verbs used in Thucydides’ own description of the plague demonstrate, 
the vocabulary of hostile, non-human agency that his narrative activates is much more 
diverse than Pericles’ language suggests. 
In Sophocles’ Oedipus the King, the description of the plague is also 
characterized by excess, with the proliferation of images of hostile agency and 
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movement having the double effect of displaying and mystifying its power. This is 
achieved through the boldness and cumulative effect of a series of loosely connected 
images, in which the boundaries between the literal, the metaphorical, and the 
metonymic blur. The ordering principle may be different from Thucydides’ (“adorning 
and amplification” as opposed to inferential data in linear sequence, if we follow the 
opposition set up by Thucydides himself between the poets and his own method in 
1.21.126), but the effect is similar. The plague is likened to the elemental forces of the 
storm (ἄγαν / … σαλεύει, 22-23) and the rough sea that is further metaphorized as 
“killing angry” (βυθῶν … φοινίου σάλου, 24). It is described as a disease spreading 
across species: among plants, flocks, and pregnant women (φθίνουσα μὲν κάλυξιν 
ἐγκάρποις χθονός, / φθίνουσα δ᾿ ἀγέλαις βουνόμοις, τόκοισί τε / ἀγόνοις γυναικῶν, 25-
27). It is depicted as a hostile force persecuting the human population (“a most hateful 
plague persecutes the city”27 ἐλαύνει, λοιμὸς ἔχθιστος, πόλιν, 27-30). It is visualized as 
an unidentified firebearing god (ὁ πυρφόρος θεός, 27; identified as Ares only later, in 
192 – on which more under “Analogy” below). It is described through fever as the 
symptom of disease (27, with fire to refer to fever). It is presented in monetary terms 
when facilitating Hades to get rich (in groans and weeping: Ἅιδης στεναγμοῖς καὶ γόοις 
πλουτίζεται, 30). Similarly in the entrance song of the Chorus, the plague is compared 
to previous destruction that loomed over the city (ἄτας, 165) and to flames of ruin 
(φλόγα, 166), it is described as a disease on all people (νοσεῖ δέ μοι πρόπας / στόλος, 
169-70), it is associated with lack of increase of the fruits (οὔτε γὰρ ἔκγονα / κλυτᾶς 
χθονὸς αὔξεται, 171-2) and with still births/miscarriages (οὔτε τόκοισιν / ἰηίων 
καμάτων ἀνέχουσι γυναῖκες, 173-4), it is presented as “worse than irresistible fire”28 
(κρεῖσσον ἀμαιμακέτου πυρὸς, 176) and as Ares scorching (φλέγει, 192), attacking 
with cries of war (περιβόητος, 192), and without the need for defensive weapons 
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(ἄχαλκος ἀσπίδων, 19129). As in Thucydides, the plague of Oedipus the King is an 
amalgamation of various types of hostile, non-human agency: divine interventions 
(fire-bringing god, god of war), elemental forces (fire, storm, rough sea), weapons (fire, 
cries of war), monsters (the Sphinx), and diseases of various kinds.  
In the opening book of the Iliad, the agency of the plague is the agency of a 
hostile god. At first glance, there are only striking differences between the multiplicity 
of micronarratives of supernatural force evoked in Sophocles and Thucydides, which 
mostly (though not exclusively) relate to what Ruth Padel calls the “aerial assailants” 
of Greek thought such as birds of prey, winged, part-animal daemons, and natural 
elements,30 and the seemingly more coherent description in the Iliad of the arrival of 
an angry Apollo with deadly arrows. But even in the Iliad, the agency of the plague is 
the result of the clustering of a number of different domains. For instance, the cause of 
the plague has to do with embodied emotions, whereas the manner in which the plague 
is inflicted has to do with military weapons. How affective regimes and military 
technologies relate to the plague requires an in-depth discussion that lies outside the 
scope of this article (though I return briefly to the issue of archery and the plague under 
“Analogy” below). There are two other aspects of the vocabulary of the Iliadic plague 
that should be discussed here. The first has to do with the verbs used to describe how 
the plague manifests itself. At least one ancient reader of Homer, the third-century BCE 
grammarian Zenodotus, thought that the plague has heavy hands that only Apollo can 
keep back, reading in line 97 “will not keep back the heavy hands of plague” (λοιμοῖο 
βαρείας χεῖρας ἀφέξει) over “will drive off from the Danaans loathsome destruction” 
(Δαναοῖσιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀπώσει).31 In the rest of Homer’s narrative, however, the 
domains with which the plague shares its power need to be deduced from verbal actions, 
rather than being explicit in nouns. The plague of Iliad 1 does not have a body or gender, 
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but it is called forth/stirred up and advances horizontally in the way storms, waves, and 
fire do (νοῦσον ἀνὰ στρατὸν ὦρσε, 10);32 Apollo’s deadly arrows go through the army 
in the way persons do (ἀνὰ στρατὸν ᾤχετο κῆλα θεοῖο, 53; ᾤχετο - “the arrows are 
personified” says Thomas Seymour33); and Apollo himself “goes over and towards” 
animals (οὐρῆας … ἐπῴχετο καὶ κύνας, 50) in the way his arrows do later.34 The only 
comparison that the text flags up is that of Apollo arriving like the night (ὁ δ᾿ ἤιε νυκτὶ 
ἐοικώς, 47). The first book of the Iliad may be “the only book with none of the extended 
similes for which Homer is justly renowned,”35 but the brief simile of Apollo 
descending like the night offers a good example of how similes assert similarities 
between conceptual domains which are dissimilar,36 and in doing so present how the 
gods travel between distinct spatial domains.37 Apollo’s divine identity is asserted 
through the speed, appearance, and purpose derived from his likeness to the night: he 
is swift, invisible, deadly. This is a simile whose “chilling power”38 is due partly to the 
associations of night with eeriness, danger, and death,39 partly to the swiftness, silence, 
invisibility, and inevitability of night’s descent, and partly to the brevity of the simile 
itself (“as brief as possible” says Simon Pulleyn40) which enacts at the level of form the 
swiftness and decisiveness with which night descends.41 
 
Metonymy  
Metonymy mobilizes and exploits pre-existing links between adjacent concepts. 
Normally, the effects created by metonymic shifts are rather “subtle,” as Sebastian 
Matzner puts it in his recent study of the trope.42 This is because metonymy, unlike 
metaphor, does not prioritize the creation of new meanings. However, metonymic shifts 
can also be used to undermine or otherwise modify pre-existing similarities between 
domains, and in such cases their effects can be “significant.”43 This section explores 
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two such shifts. First, it explores the replacement of the more specific word for 
“plague,” λοιμός, by the more general words for “disease,” νόσος, and “misfortune,” 
κακόν. What matters here is how the conceptual proximity between part and whole 
allows not only the substitution of the part by the whole, as one noun replaces another, 
but also the hijacking of the whole by the part, as characteristics specific to the part rub 
off on the whole and characteristics specific to the whole are put to the service of the 
part. Another concept to be discussed in this section has to do with unpredictability as 
a historical force in Thucydides. Here, metonymy can be used to explore not how the 
particular takes over the general but how the particular can help generate the general. 
In all three narratives examined in this article, a specific outbreak of plague 
breaks out of the domain of “plague” (λοιμός) and claims for itself a central position 
within the more general domain of “disease” (νόσος). The plague is often identified as 
“the disease” (ἡ νόσος). But to claim that “loimos and nosos are completely 
interchangeable,” as it has been argued in relation to Thucydides,44 is to obscure the 
workings and effects of the interplay between the two words. In the Iliad, the plague is 
introduced proleptically only as nosos (νοῦσον, 10), but it is immediately qualified as 
an epidemic through the magnitude of its impact (κακήν, “evil,” 10), its spreading 
across the army (ἀνὰ στρατὸν, “throughout the army,” 10), and its duration (ὀλέκοντο, 
“were perishing,” 11). The word λοιμός is not used until line 60, long after its 
devastating effects have been thoroughly established, as a way of recapitulating the 
theme of the opening scene of the poem. In the opening scene of Sophocles’ Oedipus 
the King the word for plague is also introduced late, in line 28, where we hear of λοιμὸς 
ἔχθιστος, “most abominable plague.”45 Here, the clues about the nature of the disease 
provided in the preceding lines are much less specific than in the opening of the Iliad. 
As a result, we have a climactic build up to this moment, when the nature of the disease 
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is disclosed, rather than a recapitulation. In the rest of Sophocles’ play, references to 
the plague mix with references to spilled blood as its cause (μίασμα, 97; αἷμα, 101; 
μύσος, 138; μιάσματος, 241; μίασμα, 313; μιάστορι, 353; ἀγηλατήσειν, 402, χραίνω, 
822; μίασμα, 1012; κηλῖδα, 1384; ἀνδρὸς ἀθλίου θιγεῖν, 1413; ἄγος, 1426) and give 
way to the generic vocabulary of “disease.” This vocabulary, initially introduced as 
having physical, psychological, and political associations (60-64: νοσεῖτε … νοσοῦντες 
… νοσεῖ), oscillates between specific references to the plague (as in νόσου, 149; νοσεῖ, 
169; νόσῳ, 217; νόσῳ, 303) and less specific references to disease (νοσήματος, 307; 
νοσούσης, 636; νόσου, 960, νόσοις, 962; νοσοῦσ᾽, 1061; νόσημα, 1293; νόσον, 1455). 
This facilitates the transition from the focus on the plague in the opening scenes of the 
play to the broader vocabulary of pollution and purification that dominates as the focus 
shifts away from the city towards the protagonist as an individual.46 At the same time, 
however, it also allows the plague to leave its marks on the semantic associations of the 
broader category of disease in ways that remain relevant until the end of the play – for 
instance when the “sick” Oedipus (νόσημα, 1293) asks to be driven out of the city 
(ἐκτόπιον, 1340) in the way the Chorus had earlier appealed for the plague to be driven 
out of the city (ἐκτοπίαν, 166). 
In Thucydides’ discussion of the plague in book 2, the plague is identified as 
“the disease” (ἡ νόσος, 2.47.3) from the beginning (“abruptly mentioned at the outset,” 
as Rosaria Munson puts it47) and remains so throughout the digression, as indeed it does 
when it is mentioned again in books 3 and 6 (ἡ νόσος, 2.49.6; τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου, 
2.50.1; ἡ νόσος, τὴν νόσον, 2.54.4; ἡ νόσος, 2.57.1; 2.59.1; τὴν νόσον, 2.61.3; ἡ νόσος, 
3.87.1; τῆς νόσου, 6.26.2). As in Plato’s Symposium, where “the disease” (τῆς νόσου, 
201d4) refers specifically to the historical plague of Thucydides’ narrative, what we 
have here is a taxonomic differentiation achieved exclusively through syntax. The 
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semantic hijacking of the word νόσος is achieved, in a very elementary manner, with 
the attachment of the definite article to the noun. “The disease” is made to mean 
“epidemic disease” and more specifically “a historically specific occurrence of 
epidemic disease,” in a manner that gains “the advantages of both the general and the 
concrete at the same time without sacrificing one for the other.”48 The definite article 
can be seen as performing a double displacement or substitution. First, it reduces the 
pressure on the narrator to commit himself to a linguistic definition of what he is 
referring to, shifting the focus from the here and now of the narrative to what comes 
before (anaphora), what comes after (prolepsis), and what lies beyond the 
narrative/discourse, in the world of the narrator and the reader (deixis). Second, it 
transfers the search and responsibility for meaning from the narrator to the reader who 
is invited “to find the referent in the environment, without however directing his 
attention to any particular region of it,”49 and who is therefore expected to consider 
both perceptual and cognitive factors. That Thucydides’ narrator does that at the very 
beginning of his long description of the plague may suggest a proleptic use of the 
definite article, but I think it is equally plausible to assume that the definite article is 
used here to set the narrative about to begin against the false familiarity with the plague 
implied in the article if understood as ‘particular’ (the plague that everyone knows 
about).50 
If metonymy is a choice of level of specificity, the substitution of λοιμός by ἡ 
νόσος results into something which is at once more general and more specific. Pericles 
returns to the plague with a gestural indication (ἡ νόσος ἥδε, 2.64.1) that allows him to 
proceed with the claim that it was really exceptional (“the only thing which has 
happened that has transcended our foresight” πρᾶγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν πάντων ἐλπίδος 
κρεῖσσον γεγενημένον, 2.64.1; cf. Nicias’s “we have but lately recovered somewhat” 
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νεωστὶ … βραχύ τι λελωφήκαμεν, 6.12.1). The exceptional nature of the plague does 
not only hijack the general category of νόσος with its broader associations. It also 
marginalizes the word λοιμός which is used for other, less unique and impactful 
epidemics (“no pestilence of such extent nor any scourge so destructive of human lives 
is on record anywhere” οὐ μέντοι τοσοῦτός γε λοιμὸς οὐδὲ φθορὰ οὕτως ἀνθρώπων 
οὐδαμοῦ ἐμνημονεύετο γενέσθαι, 2.47.3-4) or for the meaninglessness of linguistic 
debates about oracles, popular beliefs, and collective memory (λοιμὸς … λοιμὸν … 
λοιμὸν, 2.54.3) – on which more below. An epidemic outbreak like no other can no 
longer exemplify the general category of “epidemic disease.” It breaks out of the 
confines of that category and claims for itself the name of the even broader category of 
“disease” and the rich web of associations with physical, mental, and moral issues that 
category has.  
In Thucydides, the plague is an all-encompassing disease that pushes and 
redefines the boundaries of what disease is. It is different from any of the familiar 
diseases (ἄλλο τι ὂν ἢ τῶν ξυντρόφων τι, 2.50.1). It stands over and above one’s ability 
to describe, explain, and predict (κρεῖσσον λόγου, 2.50.1). It is also disproportionately 
powerful for human nature (χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν, 2.50.1). The 
unusual superiority of the plague over domains such as reason, language, predictability, 
and human nature, and its alien character compared to ordinary diseases, bring about 
what Thucydides sums up as “such a great upheaval” (τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς, 2.48.3). A 
number of factors account for its special nature. First, in marked contrast to the 
explanatory model for epidemic diseases favoured by physicians, it crosses different 
species (birds, dogs, humans, 2.50.2).51 Second, it has numerous and variant symptoms 
(e.g. “it chanced to affect one man differently as compared with another,” ὡς ἑκάστῳ 
ἐτύγχανέ τι διαφερόντως ἑτέρῳ πρὸς ἕτερον γιγνόμενον, 2.51.1), and no remedy works 
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on all patients (ἕν τε οὐδὲν κατέστη ἴαμα, 2.51.2).52 Third, it is what all other diseases 
end up to (“it ended in this” ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα, 2.51.2), following a process of 
transformation (“all changed into this” ἐς τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεκρίθη, 2.49.1-253). Fourth, its 
casualties outnumber those of “any” military conflict (“nothing was more exhausting 
or ruinous” μὴ εἶναι ὅ τι μᾶλλον τούτου ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε, 3.87.2).54 Finally, its 
impact is not only biological but more broadly social and political (as the focus of 2.51-
53 demonstrates).  
There is only one passage in Thucydides where νόσος coexists with, and is 
qualified by, an adjectival form of λοιμός. That is the discussion of the causes of the 
Peloponnesian War near the end of his preface in 1.23, where the plague is introduced 
for the very first time in the narrative and where it is presented as “the pestilential 
disease” (ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος, 1.23.3). The phrase can be seen as “descriptive”55 (i.e. a 
disease of the pestilential type) and technical (as in Hippocrates’ “type of pestilential 
disease” λοιμώδεος νούσου τρόπος56). However, the phrase is also “stronger than 
λοιμός,” as John Owen notes.57 What makes it marked is not only the fact that it is a 
periphrasis where the single noun λοιμός would be expected to follow on from λιμοὶ 
καὶ … (“famines and…”) as they habitually appear together (as discussed under “Near-
homonymy” below). The syntactic disruption of the hyperbaton that prepares for and 
draws attention to this periphrasis (literally: “the not least pernicious and in part utterly 
destructive, the pestilential disease” ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ 
λοιμώδης νόσος) plays an important role in what Parry calls the “unique and almost 
apocalyptic language” of this passage.58 And, once again, the definite article, this time 
repeated due to the intervening words (ἡ … ἡ), sets this particular instance of 
pestilential disease apart from all others and helps explain why in this passage on the 
causes of the war it appears as “the climax of the sufferings and disasters listed.”59 
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Another broad concept through which the plague makes itself manifest is that 
of “calamity” (κακόν). “Calamity takes various forms” (τὸ. . . κακὸν πολυειδές), as 
Aristotle puts it,60 and the plague is a specific subtype of that broader category. 
However, as is the case with “the disease,” “the calamity” (τὸ κακόν) can also be made 
to refer specifically to the plague. In Aeschylus’ Persians, the plague is the first type 
of excessive misfortune that Darius’ ghost can think of, the most obvious example of 
“the depth of misfortunes” (κακῶν … βάθος, 712). Similarly, in Herodotus the plague 
is the first example discussed among the “great ills” that threaten cities or nations 
(μεγάλα κακὰ, 6.27). In Oedipus the King, too, the Sphinx, whose hostile agency and 
impact closely resemble the plague, is presented as the one evil (κακὸν δὲ ποῖον, 128) 
that more than any other (ἐν κακοῖς, 127) prevents the Thebans from finding the 
murderer of Laius in the aftermath of his killing. When the word κακῶν reappears in 
218, in a passage where Oedipus promises to apply treatment to “the sickness” (τῇ 
νόσῳ, 217) suffered by the Thebans, it refers not to one type of calamity but to all the 
different types of calamity under the plague against which the Thebans need a defence 
and from which they ask for relief. Here, the plague is not one manifestation of calamity 
among others, nor is it the worst of all calamities, but an overarching context and 
condition for calamity. The same applies to the earlier mention of the “countless 
troubles” that the Chorus is claiming to be suffering (ἀνάριθμα … / πήματα, 168-69) 
and to the subsequent “sense of being at a loss because of toils” previously experienced 
because of the Sphinx and now again because of the plague (ἐν πόνοις / ἀλύουσαν, 694-
97) – in what is the last direct reference to the plague in the play.61  
In the Iliad too, the associations of the specific take over the meaning of the 
general. Kακὸν is an adjective that under the influence of the plague is used both for 
the disease itself and for Apollo’s arrows through which the disease spreads (νοῦσον 
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… κακήν, “evil disease,” 10-11; κακὸν βέλος, “evil arrow,” 382). As an adjective 
qualifying both the general category of disease and the specific instruments of divine 
dispensation of punishment, it comes to mean a very specific type of destruction, a 
pestilential one. It is in Thucydides, however, more than in Homer or in Sophocles, that 
the plague is identified as “the calamity” (τὸ κακόν), hijacking not only the linguistic 
demarcation of “calamity” as a broader category (as for instance in “overcome by the 
calamity,” ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι, 2.47.4) but also its multiformity: “the malady, 
starting from the head where it was first seated” (τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πρῶτον ἱδρυθὲν κακόν, 
2.49.7); “the most dreadful thing about the whole malady” (δεινότατον δὲ παντὸς ἦν τοῦ 
κακοῦ, 2.51.4); “overwhelmed by the magnitude of the calamity” (ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ 
κακοῦ νικώμενοι, 2.51.5-6). As with the general category of disease, the general 
category of calamity “lends” to a singular instance of calamity its name as well as its 
forceful effects and multiform nature. 
A final concept to be discussed under metonymy has to do with unpredictability 
as a historical force. For Thucydides’ Pericles the plague is “the sudden and unexpected 
and what happens contrary to most calculation” (τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ 
πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον, 2.61.3). It is also presented as something demonic, as 
something sent by the gods (τά … δαιμόνια, 2.64.2). To reconcile these two seemingly 
distinct domains with one another and with Thucydides’ own disbelief in both religious 
and medical modes of explanation of the plague, we need to perform a semantic leap 
away from the divide between rationality and religion, and indeed away from the domains 
of affect (where the plague has “a great part,” μέρος τι, according to Pericles’ diagnosis 
of his fellow-Athenians’ hatred toward him at 2.64.162) and foresight (with the plague 
being “the only thing which has happened that has transcended” it, πρᾶγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν 
πάντων ἐλπίδος κρεῖσσον γεγενημένον, 2.64.1). Scholars such as Robert Connor and 
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Clifford Orwin have compared Thucydides’ depiction of the plague in book 2 with the 
depiction of civil strife in book 3 (3.70-85), arguing for their similarly compressed 
language and comparable effects.63 Similarly, Ruth Padel speaks of a “parallel between 
the plague in book 2 of his History and stasis, ‘civil war,’ in book 3” which “rests on 
his [Thucydides’] culture’s familiarity with this sort of comparison.”64 If we follow the 
logic of their argument, we will conclude that the broader category of which the plague 
and civil war are different manifestations is the theme of civil society in crisis or the 
disintegration of political life. While the conceptual affinities between plague and civil 
war show how Thucydides engages with and further develops a well-established 
connection between the two,65 the logic of Thucydides’ Pericles and of the narrator’s 
own claim that the form of the disease was beyond description, expectation, calculation, 
and/or explanation (κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου, 2.50.1)66 invites us to take a 
step further in the direction of abstract deduction. The plague brings about a paradigm 
shift in the way one thinks about historical change. It is a historically specific event 
which, although like no other before, is paradigmatic of what might happen again in 
the future. As such it provides access to a new historiographical concept associated with 
the incursion into historical reality and into modes of historical explanation of the 
sudden and the unexpected.67 In doing so, it demonstrates how the “essentially 
metonymic structure of exemplarity” needs to be seen not “as a static, fixed conceptual 
schema but as a fluid, dynamic, and metonymically organized set of possibilities.”68 
The plague does not simply help perform the crossing from the concrete and historically 
specific to the abstract. It generates that abstraction, enabling epistemological claims 
about the larger domain of which it becomes part. 
 
Near-homonymy 
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Near-homonymy, rarely “identified as a linguistic phenomenon in its own right,” is 
about “words with similar phonemic shapes and, usually, different meanings.”69 I am 
particularly interested in the semantic connections between such words and in the way 
in which they habitually appear together or replace each other, conveying their meaning 
by association. Here the proximity is again at the level of nouns, but it is not only 
semantic, as is the case with the metonymic contiguity between part and whole, but also 
morphological and syntactic. The words λοιμός (“plague”), λιμός (“famine”), and 
λοιγός (“destruction”) are near-identical word-forms whose phonic and graphical 
affinities are not accidental but connected with their semantic similarities. They do not 
only sound and look similar, but they are all also associated to domains of crisis and 
destruction.  
The words for plague and famine, λοιμός and λιμός, habitually appear together 
in the “almost proverbial”70 λιμός καὶ λοιμός (“famine and plague”) which derives its 
force by affinities between the words that are simultaneously lexical, collocational, and 
semantic.71 The combination of the words must be discussed here primarily for its 
notable absence from the three narratives under examination. Pestilence and famine 
often appear together in literature. Their syntactical proximity and semantic affiliations 
as manifestations of destruction can be traced from Hesiod’s Works and Days 243 to 
Aeschylus’ Suppliant Women 659-62 and Herodotus 7.171.2.72 They are not necessarily 
linked causally, nor do they have to be simultaneous temporally, as one might be 
tempted to assume,73 but their listing together in a proverbial phrase testifies to a 
mnemonic practice and to a belief that words that sound similar and occur together in 
language should also be related in meaning. This connection is totally missing in Iliad 
1, where the plague is associated with war – a more appropriate form of destruction for 
aristocratic heroes than the Hesiodic theme of famine.74 In Sophocles’ Oedipus the King 
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it is evoked only indirectly, through blight. In lines 25-27, blight can be seen as part of 
a “general disease” that affects humans, plants, and flocks alike or as a disease that is 
complementary to, but distinct from, the plague (spatially and temporally overlapping 
and causally linked): either way, blight is conducive to famine (φθίνουσα μὲν κάλυξιν 
ἐγκάρποις χθονός, / φθίνουσα δ’ ἀγέλαις βουνόμοις, τόκοισί τε / ἀγόνοις γυναικῶν).75 
The connection between λοιμός and λιμός can be traced with more certainty when 
Thucydides brings the two concepts in close proximity in 1.23.3 (λιμοὶ καὶ ἡ οὐχ ἥκιστα 
βλάψασα καὶ μέρος τι φθείρασα ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος). Here, however, the habitual link 
between the two is both evoked and challenged, most notably through the contrast 
between the plurality of famines and the singularity of the plague and also through the 
choice of the more marked ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος over the more conventional λοιμός (as 
discussed under “Metonymy” above). The link between the two words in conventional 
discourse is revisited even more polemically in 2.54.3 (λοιμὸν … λιμόν), in the context 
of an analysis that discredits the authority of religious oracles, collective memory, and 
popular belief. If in religious discourse and in popular belief λιμός and λοιμός have 
enough in common for people to be unable to decide which of the two would be more 
appropriate in the old saying that “A Dorian war shall come and pestilence/famine with 
it” (“Ἥξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος καὶ λοιμὸς/λιμὸς ἅμ᾿ αὐτῷ”), for Thucydides this makes 
them rhetorically interchangeable and therefore of limited value. It is not only the causal 
or circumstantial link between λιμός and λοιμός that Thucydides exposes as a linguistic 
game devoid of ontological substance but also, and arguably more importantly, the 
causal or circumstantial link between the two concepts and war. For Thucydides, the 
ease with which λιμός and λοιμός can replace one another does not simply show how 
the two are interchangeable in an old saying that people remember as it suits them. It 
also shows how their combination with war amounts to a mere coincidence. For 
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Thucydides, the free exchange between near-homonyms demonstrates that there is no 
process of association between either of them and war that can be “founded upon a pre-
existing pattern of circumstances and events.”76  
By contrast to λοιμός and λιμός, the words λοιμός and λoιγός do not appear 
together in habitual speech. As Gregory Nagy and more elaborately D. R. Blickman 
have shown, λoιγός is a generic word for destruction and death in the Iliad used to 
describe the effects not only of war but also of the plague (1.67, 1.97, 1.341, 1.398, 
1.456).77 “Once the advent of the plague is established,” asks Blickman, “is there any 
significance in the preference shown for describing it as a loigos rather than a nousos 
or loimos? Or was loigos simply the most suitable traditional term available?”78 In the 
Iliad, λoιγός comes with specific associations with the slaughter of the Greeks at the 
ships.79 And through the formula “to word off devastation” (λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι, 1.341, 
1.398, 1.456 etc), it is also associated with the urgent need for a solution: “at least in 
the Iliad, the term λοιγός is not called forth simply by death or destruction on a large 
scale, but by the issue of whether such ruin can be averted or not.”80 If the plague 
belongs to the broader semantic field of “disease” more naturally than to the broader 
semantic field of “destruction,” the replacement of the world λοιμός by the word λoιγός 
asserts the affinities between the devastation brought about by the plague and the 
devastation brought about by war in the rest of the poem. If, then, the formula “to ward 
off devastation” is “a metonym for the essential story of the Iliad,”81 the poem exploits 
the near-homonymy of λοιμός and λoιγός to turn the plague into an event of broader 
significance for the story of the poem. Through its connection with λoιγός, λοιμός does 
not simply prepare for other types of destruction and pain. It also draws attention to 
their association with issues of causality and agency, raising the question of who can 
cause destruction and who has the ability to avert or stop it (thus suggesting a 
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prospective, if unstable, connection between Apollo and Achilles).82 I therefore argue 
that λοιμός and λoιγός can be seen as a case study for how near-homonymy and 
metonymy meet at lexical and conceptual crossroads: the replacement of one homonym 
by another is based on an “effect for cause” metonymy (destruction as an effect of the 
plague) or on a “whole for part” metonymy (destruction as the general category of 
which plague is a part). Such a metonymy contributes to the connection between the 
domains of disease and war while also inviting a causal reading of the Iliad’s 
preoccupation with the agency of destruction.  
 
Analogy 
Analogy is a basic philosophical method and a principle underlying figures of speech 
rather than a literary device as such. However, it is often foregrounded by the narratives 
themselves as an ordering device that maps knowledge from one domain onto another.83 
Focusing on analogy often means to shift away from object descriptions and attributes 
that different domains share, towards the sharing of a system of relations. In book 10 
of the Laws (906c-d), Plato establishes an equation between “profiteering or ‘over-
gaining’” and “what is called in the case of fleshly bodies ‘disease,’ in that of seasons 
and years ‘pestilence’ and in that of States and polities … ‘injustice’” (tr. R. G. Bury; 
φαμὲν δ᾿ εἶναί που τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον ἁμάρτημα τὴν πλεονεξίαν ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις 
σώμασι νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῖς λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσι καὶ 
πολιτείαις τοῦτο αὐτό, ῥήματι μετεσχηματισμένον, ἀδικίαν). Accounts of the plague in 
Homer, Sophocles, and Thucydides do not offer such a neat mapping of bodies, 
seasons, cities, and illnesses of the individual onto pestilence and onto social injustice. 
But they do make a strong case for thinking about plague and war in ways that bring 
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together the metonymic, the metaphorical, and the analogical in ways that cannot easily 
be disentangled. 
At the neater end of the spectrum, plague and war appear side by side, with their 
syntactical proximity (and assonance84) drawing attention to their semantic affinities. 
In Iliad 1, for instance, escaping death is conditional upon war and plague not subduing 
the Achaeans (εἴ κεν θάνατόν γε φύγοιμεν, / εἰ δὴ ὀμοῦ πόλεμός τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοιμὸς 
Ἀχαιούς, 60-61). Here Achilles sets the theme of the opening scene of the Iliad on an 
equal par with the subject-matter of the poem. As Jouanna points out, what brings 
together plague and war is the effects they have on the community.85 In addition to their 
similarly destructive effects, though, the clustering of plague and war paves the ground 
for the identification of λοιμός as λoιγός discussed above and for the parallelisms 
between Apollo and Achilles.86 In Thucydides too, the plague destroys Athens from 
within the walls while the Spartans and their allies destroy the land outside the walls 
(ἀνθρώπων τ᾿ ἔνδον θνησκόντων [2.54.2] καὶ γῆς ἔξω δῃουμένης, 2.54.1-2). Later in 
book 2, Thucydides’ Pericles invites his fellow-Athenians “to bear with resignation 
what comes from the gods and with fortitude the hardships that come from the enemy” 
(φέρειν δὲ χρὴ τά τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως τά τε ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀνδρείως, 2.64.2), 
and in book 6 Nicias speaks of the Athenians’ recovery “from a great disease and war” 
(ἀπὸ νόσου μεγάλης καὶ πολέμου, 6.12.1), with his wording echoed by the narrator 
himself (ἀπὸ τῆς νόσου καὶ τοῦ … πολέμου, 6.26.1). The two domains are not only 
analogous in their devastating effects. They also complement each other in their 
simultaneity. Although Thucydides is at pains to show that their temporal simultaneity 
is an accident (most evidently through his disruption of the link between plague and 
war as it appears in prophecies), the devastating impact of this accident is brought out 
through their pairing and semantic contamination. 
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At the other end of the spectrum, plague and war are brought together through 
vocabulary based not only on analogy but also on metonymic and metaphorical 
associations. For instance, when the Chorus of Oedipus the King attributes the plague 
to the god of war Ares, this may be unique in Greek literature, but it exploits familiar 
connections between plague and war that have to do with their assymetrical power, 
unpredictability, onrushing speed, and association with elemental forces.87 If in 
Thucydides and later literature diseases are used to explain “the morally corrosive 
effects” of political events, in the Iliad the reverse is true.88 Apollo’s infliction of the 
plague is conceptualized not only through his affective agency but also through his 
military stealth technology. When the plague is conceptualized through divine arrows 
striking from afar, suddenly and destructively, should we think of this rationally as the 
arrows carrying the disease? As an analogy for a phenomenon that belongs to a 
different domain, with the arrows being like the plague in their purpose and effect?89 
Or literally as the arrows being the plague?90 Whichever option we go for, Apollo’s 
divine archery militarizes and instrumentalizes the plague through a type of warfare 
commonly perceived as unorthodox and in the margins of the military techniques and 
moral values of the Homeric battlefield.91 The French philosopher Michel Serres may 
well be right that the unidirectionality, irreversibility, and invisibility of the arrow, far 
from marginal, exemplifies the directional atom of relation, with parasitism as the 
dynamics, rather than an obstacle, to the functioning of communication between 
different domains.92 In Greek thought too, the arrow’s assymetrical power, associated 
with deception but also with precision hitting at a distance, is about skill and ability in 
ways that fourth-century philosophy found particularly useful for thinking about the 
concept of the target or purpose.93 Homeric poetry itself might well have employed the 
connection between feathered arrows (ἰοί / ὀϊστοί πτερόεντες) and feathered words 
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(ἔπεα πτερόεντα) to show “the carryover of the efficacy of these deadly arrows to the 
effective use of speeches for dramatic purpose.”94 In the Iliad, that efficacy of flying 
missiles does not manifest itself as the spreading of words or as the spreading of death 
on the battlefield until after it has first been introduced as the spreading of deadly 
disease. Poetry, war, and communicable disease are interconnected through the non-
anthropomorphic and instrumentalized agency of technics and techniques. 
 
Allegory 
Allegory may have long been met with hermeneutic suspicion and even curiosity, but 
it is one of the oldest hermeneutic practices, predating the emergence of textual 
criticism, and calling for the need to consider grammatical and lexical knowledge and 
the pursuit of clarity within a broader framework of signification in which meaning is 
rendered problematic.95 It is precisely because of this that, like personification, allegory 
has been rehabilitated in poststructuralist thinking as central to all signification.96 The 
kind of allegory I am interested here is that of the extended narrative type, where an 
attempt is made to introduce the rational and the scientific but also the moral into a text 
whose “literal” meaning is culturally indefensible. My focus is on the plague of the 
Iliad as read in the work Homeric Problems, attributed to the grammarian of the 
Imperial period Heraclitus,97 in which no fewer than ten chapters are devoted to the 
opening book of Homer’s poem. This is the oldest surviving reading of a literary plague 
in Western literature and one of the oldest sustained readings of a whole passage of epic 
poetry, and as such it deserves inclusion in this discussion.  
The development of allegorical methods of interpretation, and more specifically 
of the identification of Homeric deities with elements and psychological dispositions, 
goes as far back as the sixth century BCE, with thinkers such as Theagenes of Rhegium 
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and Pherecydes.98 Whether Metrodorus of Lampsacus’ allegorical reading of the 
Homeric gods as parts of the human body and more specifically of Apollo as the bile 
was related to the opening book of the Iliad is not certain. It is certainly plausible: the 
identifications of world and body have obvious connections with the philosophical 
system of Metrodorus’ teacher, Anaxagoras, especially as “Apollo sends the plague in 
the Iliad, and Anaxagoras’ school was criticised by Aristotle for making the bile the 
seat of acute diseases (59A105).”99 What is more certain, however, is that, in reading 
Homer, Heraclitus also reads some of his early detractors. More specifically, Heraclitus 
defends Homer’s depiction of the plague from criticisms such as those by Zoilus of 
Amphipolis in the fourth century BCE who, commenting on Iliad 1.50, found “Apollo’s 
attack of plague upon the dogs and mules senseless and inappropriate.”100 The focus of 
such criticisms appears to have been on religious (im)piety and more specifically on 
Apollo’s killing of “innocent Greeks (who had already approved of returning Chyrseis 
to the priest in return for a ransom) indiscriminately, instead of punishing the guilty 
Agamemnon.”101 Such criticisms must have also been about “illogicalities” such as why 
Apollo’s first victims are animals,102 and why he shoots his arrows from a distance. 
Heraclitus sets up and at the same time conceals a triangulation between Homer’s text, 
his own reading of that text, and other readings that need to be refuted: as David 
Dawson puts it, “when a text is seemingly “interpreted” through allegory, “meaning” 
is not being extracted from the text; instead, power is being exercised via one text over 
other texts and the world views they represent.”103 But in refuting previous readings of 
Iliad 1, Heraclitus does not limit himself to the specifics of this or that line of Homeric 
text (and to the criticism they attracted). Rather, he delivers a defence of the larger 
episode of the plague as a description of epidemic disease fully in line with the medical 
orthodoxies of the Roman era that associate pestilence with vapours making the air 
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murky during the summer heat.104 Heraclitus addresses the question of what the plague 
of Iliad 1 means through a scientific and rationalistic reading of divine intervention and 
disease “invoking medical theory and meteorology to show that the season must have 
been summer, and hence the plague a natural phenomenon.”105 He is not arguing that 
the plague is allegorical but rather that Homer’s description of Apollo’s assault against 
the Greeks is an allegorical description of the natural workings and effects of the 
plague. Such a strategy of reading the Homeric plague “rationally” may appear to go 
against the general thrust of this article, but the way in which it is deployed allows us 
to trace continuities that underlie ostensible differences.  
Heraclitus defines allegory as “the trope which says one thing but signifies 
something other than what it says” (ὁ γὰρ ἄλλα μὲν ἀγορεύων τρόπος, ἕτερα δὲ ὧν 
λέγει σημαίνων, 5.2), which accords with the views of other ancient grammarians.106 
In Heraclitus’ narrative, the “giving of other meanings” of allegory applies to an entire 
narrative episode: “Because he views Homer as a writer who composed entire narrative 
episodes as allegories, he faces the challenge of demonstrating the overall narrative 
coherence of his individual allegorical readings.”107 That does not exclude the 
application of the same principle of “giving of other names” to individual words and 
names. On the contrary, Heraclitus’ allegory embarks from a method of substitution 
which is characteristic of close (and selective) reading. Effectively, Heraclitus’ reading 
of the plague is based on the situating of close reading and of criticisms focused on 
specific lines and issues within a broader context of narrative and signification which 
has to do not only with religion and morality but also with medicine and rationality. 
His narrativizing of interpretation is based on three specific techniques: (a) the 
appropriation, for the purposes of defending the narrative, of methods specific to close 
reading, especially etymology, (b) the linking with one another of the etymological 
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readings of several words into a wider web of allegorical interpretation based on 
substitution, and (c) the interweaving of targeted allegorical interventions with 
“existing features of Homer’s own literal story line” that ensure the coherence of the 
allegorical reading.108 As Dawson has shown, the interweaving of the allegorical and 
the literal in Heraclitus is achieved through the subjection of nouns to substitution, 
adjectives to etymology, and verbs to a literal reading.109 Apollo is identical with the 
sun (ὁ αὐτὸς Ἀπόλλων ἡλίῳ, 6.6). His cult epithets are all interpreted par-
etymologically in ways that support his identity as the sun: he is called Phoebus “not 
because of Phoebe, who is said to be Leto’s mother … [but] because of the brightness 
of his rays” (7.5-7). He is called ἑκάεργος not “from Hekaerge, the woman who brought 
the firstfruits from the Hyperboreans to Delos … [but] literally hekaergos, he who 
‘works from afar’” (7.8-9). He is called Λυκηγενῆς “not as being born in Lycia … but 
… because he is the cause of the twilight glow” (7.10-11). And he is called χρυσάορος 
“not because he has a golden sword at his belt … but… because of his rays” (7.12-13). 
As for verbs, the reading of Apollo as the sun is supported by maintaining the literal 
action of killing: “The sun gives plagues their best opportunity to be destructive” (8.1). 
To quote Dawson again, although “the sun does not literally cause their deaths, the sun 
does accompany, and create conditions favorable for, literal, physical deaths.”110  
Allegory foregrounds the medium of language as opaque and turns the text into 
“a riddle to be solved” rather than “the masterwork of a craftsman to be appreciated.”111 
This is in marked contrast to the rhetoric of textual criticism which is that of the 
sovereign poet “unsullied by what is outside”112 and which favours the transparency of 
the medium of language and the knowledge of diction and grammar as guarantors of 
lack of semantic trouble113 (based on a process of textual dissection, substitution, or 
excision of words and lines, and attribution of lack of clarity to the process of 
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redaction). What Heraclitus offers is a moralizing account of Homer’s depiction of the 
gods and a rationalizing account of his depiction of the plague, defending the authority 
of the former through the power of the latter. The focus of Heraclitus’ reading is not 
only “to salvage Homer’s reputation in respect to religious piety.”114 It is also to salvage 
Homer’s reputation in respect to medical, scientific knowledge. To achieve that, 
Heraclitus’ reading turns the episode of the plague into a site in which strategies of 
close reading, of textual purism, and of an aesthetic of clarity are brought into contact 
with larger issues of interpretation. What is being practiced is what might be perceived 
as the merging of “the study of what we would call the general meaning of texts with 
the study of the meaning of figures or words.”115 Moreover, it includes the merging of 
the poem’s form with one’s own reading of that form. One could dismiss Heraclitus’ 
approach as confusing and confused. In this section, however, I have argued that the 
invading of texts or reading practices by one another needs to be foregrounded and 
subjected to scrutiny. This is not least because, as the literary critic David Greetham 
has shown, the invasion of texts or reading practices by one another is in fact ubiquitous 
and needs to be theorized under the rubric of what he calls “the pleasures of 
contamination.”116  
 
Conclusion  
Etymologically, the Greek word for metaphor, μεταϕορά, “found first in this meaning 
in Aristotle and his contemporaries,”117 is about “carrying across” or transference. 
Being itself a metaphor, the word involves the transportation and introduction of terms 
into a linguistic environment to which they are alien (ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιϕορά, 
Poetics 1457b7).118 Whether metaphors move by the poet in ways that cannot be taught 
and communicated, as Aristotle maintains, or move by themselves, as Cicero has it,119 
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they are clearly associated with a twin process that mystifies the workings of 
transmission between domains while also celebrating the vividness of its effects. The 
aesthetic pleasure to be derived from encountering figurative language has to do with 
the recognition of similarities between distinct domains and with the vividness and 
immediacy achieved through this mediation. If contagion is to be seen in relation to 
narrative techniques associated with the workings and effects of metaphor and, as I 
have argued in this article, in relation to other techniques associated with recognition, 
surprise, and vividness, from metonymy to allegory, it needs to be seen in terms of 
transmission as something transformative: transformative not only for the words or 
phrases that move, in ways that cannot be taught and learned, but also for the narrative 
they invade and for those they move through the pleasures of surprise, recognition, and 
immediacy: listeners, readers, spectators.  
 Does the plague exist outside a usage of words and phrases whose 
understanding is based on analogy, comparison, and similarity, or on association and 
contiguity? The vocabulary of the plague can be seen as a case study for the different 
meanings of the word ἀλλότριος (“alien”) that Aristotle uses in the Poetics (21, 1457b7, 
31) to articulate the function and power of metaphor: deviation, borrowing, 
substitution.120 It can also be related to other processes associated with tropological 
language such as the saying “other than what one seems to say,” as ancient rhetorical 
definitions of allegory have it.121 The narratives of the Iliad, Oedipus and King and the 
History of the Peloponnesian War can be seen as building their own networks of 
linguistic associations and substitutions for what constitutes the plague with the help of 
modern discussions of contagion and language as they emerge in contemporary critical 
thought, conceptual metaphors as used in cognitive linguistics, and linguistic tropes as 
they come to be understood (and debated) in ancient rhetoric and philosophy. It is by 
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bringing these narratives into contact with such hermeneutic apparatuses that one can 
appreciate how their depiction of the plague exploits language formation as a set of 
operations based on the interaction between different registers and different linguistic 
domains associated with the sounds and meanings of words, the structure of sentences, 
and language as cognitive and discursive practice. The plague takes over the routes of 
language in the way it takes over the geographical, financial, and military routes of the 
Athenian empire in Thucydides or the routes of emotions and the routes of information 
in all three narratives explored in this article. One can push aside this language as 
anachronistic or ornamental, looking instead for the historical facts or literal meanings 
it conceals, following the paradigms of the history of medicine or of philological 
purism. Alternatively, one can use it in the way this article has suggested, to explore 
the ways in which the plague of archaic and classical Greek narrative is a constellation 
of such uses of language, exploiting their operations as it spreads across verbal 
structures of space, time, knowledge and affect.122  
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culture” (Genosko 1994, 53-54). Viral metonymy is a type of uncontrollable “dispersion by contiguity,” 
of a relation between original and copy “in which the copy substitutes itself for the original from which 
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18 On the rhetoric of rhetoric as seductive ornamentation and of figuration as cosmetic concealment, see 
Todorov 1982, 74-75.  
19 Paxson 2009, 33, describing how De Man sees the theorization of proposopopeia. 
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31 The translation of Zenodotus’ reading is by Pulleyn 2013, 151. 
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outside the scope of the present article. 
66 Hornblower 1991, 323 on 2.50.1: “beyond description or expectation;” Rusten 1989, 186 on 2.50.1 
“beyond explanation;” Marshall 1990, 168: “beyond calculation.” 
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69 On near homonymy, see Philip 1996, 69 and Coates 1968. 
70 Owen 1857, 221; Blickman 1987, 259. 
 45 
                                                                                                                                           
71 On λοιμός and λιμός in ancient Greek literature, see Jouanna 2006 who provides an overview of how 
the two words are used side by side from Homer to late antiquity and Bruzzone 2017. See also Gourevitch 
2013. 
72 Later passages discussed in Jouanna 2006 and Gourevitch 2013. 
73 As Jouanna 2006, 200 perceptively notes, pace West 1978, 218 on Hesiod’s Works and Days 243 and 
Demont 2013.  
74 Jouanna 2006, 202. 
75 Kamerbeek 1967, 38 on Soph. OT 27: if ἐν at line 27 is adverbial “the loimos echthistos has to be 
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